In yesterday's post I talked about two ways of thinking; the "problematizing" way of Dostoevsky's Notes from the Underground, and the "intuitive" way of the same author's The Dream of a Ridiculous Man. For those who have been following me, it is evident that these two manners of thinking also represent two philosophical interests of mine. On the one hand there is the philosophy of problems; a dynamic conception of philosophy that conceives of itself as a never-ending struggle that dispels with any notion of "grounding"; represented by my interest in Deleuze, Nietzsche, Kant, and Shestov, among others. On the other hand there is the philosophy of subjectivity and life, which conceives of itself as giving acces to an unshakable apodicticity in a non-intentional presence of life(or consciousness) with itself in subjectivity; represented by my interest in Eckhart, Descartes, Henry, Biran, and Fichte, among others. (Interesting question: where do the Greeks stand in this? Do they occupy a middle ground? A reading of Plotinus or Damascius sure suggests so).
As such, yesterday's post on Dostoevsky was not only a post on Dostoevsky, but can be read as a program for my future writings. On the one hand, there will be the study of a philosophy of life and subjectivity (might do a close reading of Henry’s Essence de la Manifestation), and on the other hand there will be the study of the question: "what is a problem?" through a series of articles on relevant philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche, Shestov, Deleuze,... (currently I am reading Michel Meyer's De la problématologie, which is offering great food for thought.) It is my, still very unclear, idea that I will eventually be able to combine these seemingly incompatible currents of thought. But this is, of course, a project that will take many many years. As for now, I will just read. I invite you to join me.
"One must really be a great man to be able to make a stand even against common sense.’
“Yes, and a fool as well.”
- Dostoevsky, The Possessed, Part II, Ch. II.