Its own mode of deceit

Plotinus on deception, reading Ennead IV.4(28)

I.

As humans, we are deceived. There are things which attract our attention, and in offering our attention to these things, we let these things control our attention. There need not be malicious intent, or someone deceiving us, to speak of deception. It is as Plotinus says, nature itself generates its own mode of deceit.(IV.4.44.) As such, living, when we have no control over our attention, is not living, but being lived. Everything in the universe affects; there is always a thing affected, and something affecting. The degree to which we are free, is the degree to which we affect. And the degree to which we are unfree, is the degree to which we are being affected. The pursuit of freedom, is the pursuit of becoming, in action, the affecting part of the equation. The mere possibility of such a becoming-free from deception, admits of Plotinus’ view that the soul is an amphibian being, marked by a duality. There is a non-rational part of the soul, that like all parts in nature, is affected by causes in nature. This part is victim to deception, a mere plaything for whatever forces might be fighting for its attention. There is also a rational part of the soul, this part is unaffected by the forces in nature, and thus immune to the deception of nature. It is to the degree to which we are able to identify with this rational part of the soul, that we are able to rise above the deception. But when we don’t, and we identify ourselves only with that part which is affected, we become mere slaves to whatever objects nature throws at us. This deception, Plotinus designates as “sorcery and spells.” For there is in fact no essential difference between the sorcery carried out by a person to influence someone, and the “sorcery” or deception carried out by nature itself. In both cases, there is an object that catches our attention, that lures us in, and we give our attention to this object. 

II.

Let us read. 

“But how does the virtuous person fall under the influence of sorcery and spells?” (IV.4.43.) 

This is impossible for Plotinus, for the virtuous person is he who has identified himself with the rational part of his soul, and he is thus undisturbed vis-à-vis what affects the non-rational part. Of course, there are degrees. And one is the more undisturbed, the more one is able to detach from the influence of the non-rational part, and the more one is able to identify with the rational part. 

“For everything that pays attention to something else is liable to be bewitched by that something; the thing that it pays attention to bewitches it and exerts a pull on it.” (IV. 4.43)

Everything that pays attention to something else is a possible victim to deception. For in a very basic sense, everything we put our attention to “controls” us. It determines what we think about, it ignites feelings in us, and it might even determine the actions we undertake. As that which grasps our attention, it is that which determines our attention. This “paying attention to something else”, is what in modern parlance we could call intentionality. The idea that consciousness is consciousness-of. In Husserlian phenomenology lives the idea that all consciousness is intentional, consciousness is always consciousness of something else than this consciousness. Plotinus is here telling us that this type of consciousness is always liable to deception. In fact, it is a type of consciousness that is in essence a being-deceived. It is a consciousness in which this consciousness itself is not in control, but is controlled by that towards which the consciousness puts its attention. Seen from Platonism, the Husserlian battle-cry :“back to the things themselves”, sounds insignificant. For, in fact, it is only a returning to the things insofar as we are deceived. It is a phenomenology of descent, of confusion. A phenomenology, that is, a study of phenomena. But all phenomena can bewitch us, and drag us away from that which truly is. As the study of intentional appearing, phenomenology is the pursuit of that which bewitches, a pursuit that Plotinus warns for.  

III.

“Only that which is focused on itself is immune to sorcery. Every action, therefore, can be subject to sorcery, as can the whole life of the practical person; for he is moved towards those things which bewitch him.” (IV.4.43)

Every soul that is directed towards something else than itself is subject to sorcery. For being directed towards something, is not a veritable act of the soul, but is always an admittance of attention or a complying to a pull exerted on the soul by a something. 

“Why, after all, does one direct one’s attention to something? It is through being drawn to it, not by magic crafts, but by the crafts of nature, which generates its own mode of deceit.”(IV.4.43) 

There is first the pull of the object, and only secondly does the soul choose to put its attention in this object. It complies, freely, to this pulling. This freedom, however free it might be, can diminish over time. When one complies to the object once, when one lets the object pull oneself once, it becomes natural to do it again. And over time, this can grow to an addiction. An addiction in which, as much as one freely puts one’s attention to the object, it feels more like the object is in control. You no longer drink the drink, but the drink is now drinking you. And over time, one even grows to love this giving away of one’s attention. So enamoured by the pulling of the object, one forgets that one is a soul that is allowing this pulling, and one comes to value this object more than one values oneself, than one values one’s soul. Plotinus compares such an unfree person to a pig. They do not seek to clean themselves, but actually delight in covering themselves in filth.(I.6.6) As Heraclitus speaks: “Pigs delight in the mire more than in clean water.”(DK 13) We not only put our attention towards appearances, but we come to value these appearances over our own souls. In such a scenario, it is no longer even the soul that illuminates the objects to which it puts its attention. But it are these objects that illuminate the soul. Even though, in essence, the rational part remains forever unaffected, however “addicted” one may become. However, the attention is so strongly fixated on the objects, that one no longer has attention for oneself. One’s awareness is so fixated on things other than oneself, that one is no longer aware of oneself. Even though this self necessarily subsists, unaffected, underneath. 

IV.

As soul, we all have our own Odyssey to complete. Deceived all around, struggling to keep our attention set on our own soul, on what we know to be right, on what we know to be our path. Deceived and carried by all sorts of things that prevent us from returning home. Home: ourselves, our souls.  

“It is only contemplation that is left to be immune to sorcery, because no one whose attention is focused on himself is subject to sorcery.” (IV.4.44) 

If — for the basic fact that all objects of attention have an influence — it is the case that all intentionality is liable to deception, it follows that only a consciousness fully abiding within itself is immune to being deceived. In such an abiding, there is no longer a separation between the soul being conscious, and something else of which this soul is conscious. There is no longer a separation between subject and object. There is no longer a light that illuminates, and an object being illuminated, and we have completely become the light itself. It is only such contemplation, completely foreign to any action (for all action presupposes an object towards which one acts), that is completely immune to the sorcery of both men and nature.

“For he is one, and the object of his contemplation is himself, and his reason is not open to deception, but he does what he must do, and creates his own life and his proper work.”(IV.4.44).

In all action, we are influenced, only contemplation escapes this influence. For in contemplation, there is no object of consciousness. And thus, there is nothing that could possibly influence, there is nothing that could possibly deceive. 

V. 

Of course, a state of pure contemplation is only reserved for the few, and even for those, not attainable all the time. Plotinus seems to suggest that, even though all life (except for pure contemplation),  is subject to sorcery to a certain degree, there is the possibility of going through life (relatively) undeceived. Even in a state that isn’t pure contemplation. When the non-rational part of the soul is being pulled in all directions, there is always the possibility of resisting this pull. As Plotinus says: 

“Only that person is not subject to sorcery who, when he is being drawn by his other parts, says that none of the things are good which they say are good, but only what he himself knows to be good.” (IV.4.44)

One can look at something, yet still have one’s attention focused elsewhere. One can even be deeply engaged with something, yet not let this something drag one’s attention away from the rational part of the soul. An example might be the courage displayed in war. One is deeply involved in the war. But if there is courage present, this means that one’s attention is with the rational part of the soul; which knows not of the fear of dying, of getting wounded, etc. A pre-condition for virtuous action is thus that one is, at least somewhat, detached from the non-rational part. One is able to face what affects the non-rational part, but is able to do so with the strength, serenity, and wisdom of the rational part. One is able to confront the sorcery, but refrain from listening to it. 

“And what is courage but the absence of fear of death? But death is the separation of the soul from the body. And this is not feared by one who longs to be alone.”(I.6.6.) 

This last sentence is worth paying attention to, and gives us insight into how we let ourselves be deceived. Plotinus says that separation of the soul from the body “is not feared by one who longs to be alone.” There is thus, underlying the activity of putting one’s attention towards what is different from us, a fear. A fear to be alone with oneself, to have one’s attention fully focused on oneself. And this fear drives the soul to seek out other objects, to no longer concentrate its attention into itself, but to disperse its attention into a myriad of objects appearing below it. As much as it is deceived, it is the soul itself that opens itself up for deception. It is the soul itself, that dares to flee itself, because it dares not to face itself. 

Sources: 

Plotinus, The Enneads. Edited by Lloyd P. Gerson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.